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Book Review
THE TORTS PROCESS. By James A. Henderson, Jr. and Richard N.
Pearson. Boston, Massachusetts: Little, Brown and Company,
1975. Pp. xlix, 1008.
Few recent texts have challenged the conception that tort law is
wholly embodied in a collection of appellate cases laying out substantive
rules, their variations and exceptions. The Torts Process offers an al-
ternative approach.
The authors view tort law as offering a vehicle by which the entire
lawyerly process of interviewing, investigation, pleading, discovery, mo-
tion practice, damage assessment, negotiations, trial preparation, litiga-
tion, appeal, and even reform legislation can be understood by the begin-
ning student. There are some difficulties, to be sure, in implementing
this vision in a single, manageable book. Some lawyers' skills, for ex-
ample, can best be learned later in the law school experience. Indeed,
even with exposure to clinical programs, few of the litigation skills are
mastered until several years after graduation. Thus, undue emphasis in
the first semester of law school might be wasted. However, a torts
course using this book would not be a surrogate for courses in trial
practite, professional responsibility, civil procedure, or a clinical experi-
ence. Rather, the attempt is to give students new to the law a back-
ground which will aid them in mastering the application of the substan-
tive rules which they are learning.
This approach has potential for enriching the torts course experi-
ence in at least four ways. First, the need for a separate (and often
somewhat stultified) legal systems course is reduced and the vital in-
formation about trial procedure and appellate processes can be absorbed
in a more interesting, integrated fashion. Second, the problem of peda-
gogical oversight should be reduced. Things which the instructor takes
for granted-or else, would prefer not to discuss for fear a cynical
presentation would disillusion the students-are presented in a sensitive,
yet provocative fashion. This forces the student to identify the tensions
that must be reconciled and the obstacles that must be overcome for the
torts system to function optimally. No doubt students could graduate
and practice law without this kind of an appreciation, but anyone in-
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
terested in procedural reform, social economics, and "making law" at
the appellate level must surely need these insights.
Even for the less ambitious student, this approach helps to identify
the trade-offs and problems involved in the litigation process. The au-
thors, of course, cannot guarantee that the bench, bar, and jury will
consistently follow their assigned roles, or invariably make principled
decisions. Yet the very identification and articulation of these problems
should help to alleviate the perplexed student's laments that tort law is
"nebulous," and that tort law is formed by "unpredictable Gestalt re-
actions" from juries and the only slightly more predictable decisions of
appellate courts which arbitrarily define the law.
The third way in which the "process" approach should benefit stu-
dents of tort law is that it brings greater realism to the collection of
appellate decisions. A student is given intriguing glimpses of the many
steps that lead to the record on appeal and the formulation of issues and
arguments in the appellate court. The function of a lawyer and the
need for a lawyer's skills at every phase can be perceived readily. Prob-
lems are presented at each stage of the process and students are asked to
participate, in a truncated fashion, in the lawyer's tasks. All of this is
designed to stimulate the student's curiosity and enhance his interest in
the activities of tort lawyers. This is an objective which, if obtained,
is bound to facilitate the learning of the substantive law.
A fourth benefit from the "process" approach is the exposure to
problems of professional ethics. In this post-Watergate era, faculty and
students alike are concerned with the issue of how best to instill a
strong legal ethic. Even in schools where the course method of teach-
ing professional responsibility is employed, in contrast with the perva-
sive method, it is usually recognized that discussion of legal ethics should
occur early in the legal education, i.e. from the earliest time the students
begin to be "socialized" into their future role as attorneys.
The practice of tort law produces its share of ethical dilemmas. A
process-oriented book offers a ready matrix for those who desire an
early, integrated approach to professional responsibility. The authors
have devised credible scenarios, and conflicting policies are often closely
balanced. As with most ethical matters, the answers are seldom clearcut
or decisive, but the problems will surely stimulate earnest and thought-
ful discussion. Moreover, by putting the issues in scenarios, the sterility
of memorizing lofty and abstract code sections is avoided.
Before turning to specifics in the book, a brief pedagogical note
may be in order. As advantageous as the process approach appears to
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be, the anxieties and insecurities of first year students must be taken
into account. It is well known that beginning law students crave "learn-
able" materials and yearn for statements of black-letter law. Thus, a
course like torts, with its reliance on "reasonable persons" and "policy,"
becomes an anxiety-producer for some students. The fact -that these
qualities give tort law a flexibility and dynamism which is one of the
great strengths of the common law is appreciated-if at all-much later
in the students' legal education. For these students, then, there is some
danger that the "process" approach may become distracting and be
viewed as an obstacle to "learning the law."
Last year, as I used a pre-publication version of The Torts Process,
two of my students (out of a class of ninety) complained that "all this
role playing and jurisprudence and ethics" impeded their ability to learn
tort law which was "confusing enough as it is." One suspects that these
same students, a year or so later, will be heard to present an ironic epi-
logue. In support of more clinical courses or freshman electives, they
may characterize the first-year required courses as "strictly theoretical
packages of abstract principles compartmentalized and detached from
the actual functions of an attorney." The danger then is falling be-
tween the stools. By including problems, process notes, and ethical
issues, will the authors distract the struggling students, yet not go far
enough in their simulations to achieve the experiential benefits of a
clinical program or externship?
The Torts Process cannot be charged with this shortcoming. Since
mere learning of legal rules is by no means the only objective of a legal
education, and is probably not even its most significant objective (al-
though it may well be the most time-consuming under present formats),
approaches such as Professors Henderson and Pearson have employed
in their text are vitally necessary. Hopefully, those anxious students
can be counseled to appreciate and reap the benefits of the broader ap-
proach. But students are, after all, taught to be pragmatists and skep-
tics in law school and they may well argue that the rewards system
emphasizes learning law rather than the more comprehensive scheme
in which the law operates. No doubt to a large extent this is presently
true. However, as instructors gain experience with the book they should
be able to fashion more creative examinations which will begin to reflect
the broader learning potential available.
As a device for gaining exposure to the torts process, the authors
have utilized a scheme of thematic, "continuing" notes. They have clas-
sified these themes under the following categories: "Mechanisms for
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Resolving Disputes," "The Law/Fact Distinction," and "Law and Be-
havior." With only two exceptions, these notes are confined to the por-
tion of the book that is likely to be covered in the first semester (or first
two quarters) of the torts course.
The book opens with a chapter devoted to the tort of battery and
the defenses to intentional torts. It is rather puzzling that the rest of
the materials concerning intentional torts to persons is deferred until
Chapter 11. Presumably, it is because the authors wish to focus on dig-
nitary wrongs and the intentional infliction of mental distress, and are
only passingly interested in assault, offensive touching, and false im-
prisonment. Certainly these four torts have in common an injurious
impact upon the state of mind rather than upon the body; but then so
does the negligent infliction of emotional distress, which is found toward
the end of Chapter 6 ("Negligence"), and invasion of privacy, which is
treated in Chapter 13.
The authors, in their teaching manual, apparently anticipate that
many instructors will teach the intentional mental distress torts at the
same time they teach battery at the beginning of the course.' If most
instructors do present these coverages back-to-back, the organization
may prove distressing to those students who resent "jumping around"
in the book. Presumably, these students find reviewing facilitated, and
find it easier to gain a sense of where the course is going, when the in-
structor progresses through the book from front to back.
One of the first notes on the law/fact distinction does a good job
of explaining the purpose of and requirements for directing a verdict.2
The first note on professional responsibility raises the timeless inquiry
of whether a member of the Bar is merely a "hired gun" or whether
he or she should offer objective counseling to the client'in order to
achieve or protect more transcendental societal needs.' The second prob-
lem illustrating the nuances of the privilege of self-defense requires the
student to construct a closing argument on behalf of the plaintiff.4 De-
pending on the time and space available, this problem can be dramatized
quite effectively. A judge and jury can be added and a defense summa-
tion can be presented as well. Early in the course, such a device is quite
stimulating and interesting to the students. As the weeks go by, how-
' J. HENDERSON& R. PEARSON, SUGGESTIONS FOR TEACERS USINGM TORTS PROCESS
77 (1975).
2 J. HENDERSON & R. PEARSON, THE TORTS PROCESS 32 (1975) [hereinafter cited as THE
TORTS PROCESS].
3 Id. at 36.
4 Id. at 52-55.
[Vol. 51 :23
BOOK REVIEW
ever, the dramatization device becomes less effective as only a small
fraction of a typically large class can participate.
Another device employed in the book is the use of "Short Prob-
lems" to exemplify particularly close questions to be decided under the
rules of the principal cases. After giving the facts and offering some
provocative comments, the authors provide the solution by means of
paraphrasing the actual case from which the problem was drawn. This
format represents a compromise between rich detail and bludgeoning
the students with excessive numbers of appellate decisions. Despite the
ingenious camouflage, however, an appellate case-is still an appellate case.
My impression is that, after the novelty had worn off, most students did
not really accept the challenge of the "problem," but immediately read
on to the judicial solution. Nevertheless, there is a lot to be said for
the variety and extra depth that has been added at only a slight cost.
The discussion of battery is concluded with a note on effectuating
the policies of deterrence and compensation through tort law, and some
penetrating questions are raised as to the pathways by which and the
extent to which tort law influences behavior.'
The book next turns to the rules of cause in fact. This section
contains an excellent problem which presents a situation where there
is a high probability that one of a group of defendants is responsible
for the injury, but where there is no way of demonstrating which indi-
vidual is responsible (concurrent causes are ruled out). This problem
is replete with summaries of interviews of various witnesses. The Cali-
fornia cases of Summers v. Tice6 and Ybarra v. Spangard are offered
as precedents in the mythical jurisdiction of Columbia where the prob-
lem is set. The package is completed with the ethical dilemma of how
far a lawyer should go in preparing a witness to testify.'
Chapter 3 on vicarious liability is similar to Chapter 12 on defama-
tion. Both chapters are almost entirely textual and are supplemented
with problems rather than case readings. The condensation of the law
of defamation into thirty-two pages is especially well done. Since the
I Id. at 80-87.
6 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948).
725 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944). I was sorry not to see the groundbreaking
case of Chance v. E. I. DePont de Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972)
offered in the section on one-out-of-a-known-group causation. Admittedly, the "common
standards" aspect of this case will seldom occur outside of a manufacturer's liability
context, but the creative, unconventional approach of the court should be pedagogically
worthwhile. Similarly, a case like Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., 493 F.2d
1076 (5th Cir. 1973) would be very useful to launch a discussion of concurrent causation
and unapportionable injury.
8 THE TORTS Paocss at 116-17.
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first amendment immunities have come to dominate the common law
of defamation, the authors contented themselves with presenting only
the New York Times9 and Gertz"° cases as appellate opinions. These
materials integrate well with a problem which requires the student to
advise an outraged client who feels he has been libeled."
Two of the substantive areas most frequently overlooked in torts
books are vicarious liability and immunities. Both of these are expressly
and ably (albeit briefly) covered in The Torts Process.'2 The short
chapter on vicarious liability did fail, however, to discuss the liabilities
of members of unincorporated associations.'" Perhaps associations were
not mentioned because there is a relative paucity of authority in this
area. However, as hobby clubs, charitable groups and recreation asso-
ciations proliferate, such questions are more and more often being
asked of attorneys."4
An excellent treatment of damages is found in Chapter 4. Most
casebooks and hornbooks give damages short shrift. Consistent with
their philosophy that the entire process deserves study, the authors give
cases on medical expenses, lost earnings, pain and suffering, wrongful
death, and punitive damages. One of the problems presented in this
chapter is particularly informative as it reproduces statements of wit-
nesses and letters from treating and examining doctors. The authors
have also included six pages from a medical treatise on back injuries.'"
A student is requested to do a damage workup on a lower-back injury.
It is doubtful that this problem can be handled during a class period
and the instructor may not care to grade written assignments, but even
a "dry run" through the problem by the student is bound to be educa-
tional. The authors also discuss the ethical problems incurred in the
settlement process and the contingent fee contract.'6 So long as cover-
age was devoted to damages, it is unfortunate that the fascinating issue
of probable increased susceptibility to disease and the difficulties of quan-
tifying this condition were not discussed.'7
9New York 'imes Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
'0 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
" THE TORTS PROCESS at 854-57.
12 Id. at 121-38 (vicarious liability) and 518-21 (immunities).
'"Commercial joint ventures, automobile joint venture, and respondeat superior are
treated. Id. at 121-38.
14 Compare DeVillars v. Hessler, 363 Pa. 498, 70 A.2d 333 (1950) with White v. Cox,
17 Cal. App. 3d 824, 95 Cal. Rptr. 259 (1971). Cf. Wheatley v. Carl Halvorson, Inc.,
213 Ore. 228, 323 P.2d 49 (1958) (applying partnership law to joint venturers).
15 THE TORTS PRocESs at 175-89.
,6 Id. at 202-03.
17 See Feist v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 267 Ore. 402, 517 P.2d 675 (1973) for an
articulate resolution of this problem.
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The remaining chapters of the book are grouped in Part III, which
is titled "Substantive Bases of Liability." The opening chapter is a
complete coverage of negligence law. Followers of Leon Green18 may
be disappointed to see a fairly brief discussion of the duty issue (treat-
ing only the duty to rescue) buried in a subsection entitled "Limitations
on Liability." Similarly, the foreseeability analysis is handled under
another subsection entitled, "Proximate Cause." Even for enthusiasts
of the Green approach, however, this organization does not represent
insurmountable difficulties. At most, it may require assigning certain
portions of the chapter out of page-number order. The analysis of the
breach issue is especially well developed. It begins with risk versus
utility, and reasonable person, progresses through negligence per se,
custom, and practice, technical expertise, and concludes with res ipsa
loquitur. An especially good combination of cases, a note, and a prob-
lem are presented in the section on expert testimony. 9 A concise sec-
tion utilizing the problem format and the leading case of Rowland v.
Christian?* illustrates the varying standards of care traditionally ex-
pected of occupiers of land.
The problem in the subsection on duty-to-rescue raises the difficult
and sensitive problem of dealing with a lying client." This problem was
very effectively dramatized in our class by using an outsider to play the
role of the client. Another interesting subsection deals with the negligent
infliction of emotional distress as an instance of "non-liability for fore-
seeable consequences." The fascinating case of Shurk v. Christison is not
discussed, possibly because its factual situation makes it too unusual."2
The three-page coverage of comparative negligence is obviously
very superficial. The intricacies of comparative negligence, especially as
it may relate to indemnification and contribution, can be quite difficult
to present to a large class. Nevertheless, a major torts casebook should
at least attempt to identify the principal problems involved. 3
The chapter on products liability is divided between cases concerning
flawed products and those concerning products which are defectively
SI See, e.g., Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 CoLum. L. REv. 1014
(1928), 29 CoLumh. L. Rav. 255 (1929); Green, Foreseeability in Negligence Law, 61
Couirm. L. REv. 1401 (1961).
19 HE ToRTs PRocass at 340-54.
20 69 Cal. 2d 108, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
21 T= ToRTs PRocEss at 401-02, 406-11.
22 80 Wash. 652, 497 P.2d 937 (1972) (emotional distress of parents upon learning
daughter sexually molested by son of defendants hired as babysitter).2 3 See, e.g., Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, 504 F.2d 400 (7th Cir. 1974); Dole v. Dow
Chemical Corp., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972). See generally, V. SchWARTZ,
CoARATV NEGrzIGNcE (1974).
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designed or marketed. The Cintrone, Seely and Rostocki cases are used
to illustrate the problems of the scope of the strict liability remedy with
regard to rented products, economic losses and hybrid sales of services
and products, respectively.24 Cronin v. J. B. E. Olson Corp.2" provides
a starting point for a discussion of the element of defectiveness. One of
the few shortcomings of this chapter is that there is very little interstitial
text. The debate on the need to show defectiveness and how it can be
shown (including the circumstantial evidence problem in non-specific
defect cases) is not treated at all in text.26 Nor is the problem of applying
strict liability to the sale of used goods presented.27
The section on the liability of manufacturers for design defects
and failure-to-warn is appropriately tailored around Professor Hender-
son's excellent article. 8 Development of this section is more detailed and
more cases are used to illustrate the incremental gropings of courts for
doctrinal support in this area. The strong negligence overtones of de-
fective design cases are noted, as is the ability to mitigate the hazard of
a limited design through adequate warnings and instructions as to its
use. As the authors suggest, however, this is the beginning-not the
end of the problem. In the case of inadvertent design defects, it is some-
what elliptical to speak of warnings, since the manufacturer is hardly
in a position to warn against something it doesn't realize itself. As to
conscious-design decisions, the polycentricity which is inherent in assess-
ing the "reasonableness" of any given design is seen by Professor
Henderson as precluding courts and juries from making principled
decisions.29 Although the Rostocki case3' has a passing reference to the
problem of unavoidable defects (Comment k to Restatement § 402(a)),
the problem of uncorrectable and unknowable defects" is not directly
24 Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Service, 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965) ;
Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965); Rostocki v. Southwest
Florida Blood Bank, Inc., 276 So. 2d 475 (Fla. 1973).
25 Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972).
26 See, e.g., Brown v. Western Farmers Assoc., 268 Ore. 470, 521 P.2d 537 (1974)
(chicken feed causes hens to stop laying marketable eggs); Markle v. Mulholland's, Inc.,
265 Ore. 259, 509 P.2d 529 (1973) (blow-out in recapped tire after 5,000 miles of use);
Alaman Bros. Farm & Feed Mill v. Diamond Laboratories, Inc., 437 F.2d 1295 (5th Cir.
1971) (non-specific defect).
27 See, e.g., Cornelius v. Bay Motors, Inc., 258 Ore. 564, 484 P.2d 299 (1971) (hydraulic
seals on brakes of used car driven 50,000 miles); Markle v. Mulholland's, Inc., 265 Ore. 259,
509 P.2d 529 (1973) (recapped tires); Raritan Trucking v. Aero Commander, Inc., 458
F.2d 1106 (3rd Cir. 1972) (replacement part sold and installed in plane by defendant).
2 8 Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturer's Conscious Design Choices: The Limits
of Adjudication, 73 CoLuar. L. REV. 1531 (1973).
29 THE ToRTs PROcass at 650-54.
30 Rostocki v. Southwest Florida Blood Bank, Inc., 276 So. 2d 475 (Fla. 1973).
31 See Schwartz, Products Liability and Judicial Wealth Redistribution, 51 IND. L.J.
- (1976) [forthcoming] for a discussion of the redistributional effects of liability for
losses resulting from unknowable risks.
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treated. As products become more sophisticated, and as more obscure
side effects come to light, both bench and bar must give attention to
this problem.32
The book has chapters on workmen's compensation, no-fault auto-
mobile schemes, and the commercial torts of misrepresentation and un-
fair competition.33 Chapter 10 is devoted to trespass, nuisance, and a
discussion of legal methods for protecting the environment. This chapter
begins with an excellent summary of the substantive law of trespass and
nuisance, using the 1971 and 1972 revisions of the Restatement of
Torts to highlight the various tests employed. The cases in the subsec-
tion that follows include such landmarks as Martin v. Reynolds Metal
Co."' and Boomer v. Atlantic Cement,3 5 as well as the controversial case
of Crushed Stone Co. v. Moore.6 The subsection concludes with a fairly
complex problem designed to force the student to think about the ad-
missibility of various types of evidence and about which issues should
be allowed to reach the jury."' The final subsection of the chapter deals
with private actions to protect the public interest in the environment.
This section draws heavily on readings from the literature and stimu-
lates discussion of fundamental matters such as growth versus no-
growth, the public trust doctrine, and effluent permit schemes, as well
as some procedural problems dealing with class actions. 8
Professors Henderson and Pearson have carefully constructed a
casebook which addresses itself to all the major problems of tort law
and which, at the same time, exposes the student to the torts process.
Integrating substantive rules with jurisprudential, procedural, and prac-
tical concepts is no easy task. Nor is it easy to design problems which
are realistic and challenging but which do not unduly impede orderly
progress through the subject matter. In both of these efforts, I think
the authors have been remarkably succesful. The addition of sections
on damages, vicarious liability, and nuisance is useful to the instructor
in the first year curriculum. The cases and textual comments are cur-
rent and stimulating. The authors' style is sensitive and lucid. It strikes
3 2 At least one court has attempted to fashion a prototypical instruction which will
allow an inadvertent design error case to reach a jury by using the concept of imputed
knowledge of the risk of danger (assuming the risk is "knowable" under the present state
of scientific knowledge) coupled with a "reasonableness" test. See Phillips v. Kimwood
Machine Co., - Ore. -, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974). Cf. Green v. American Tobacco Co.,
391 F.2d 97 (1968), 409 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1969).
33 T=a ToRTs PRocEss at 683-739, 901-96 (Chapters 9 & 14).
34 221 Ore. 86, 342 P.2d 790 (1959).
35 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870 (1970).
36369 P.2d 81l (Okla. 1962).
37 T3 ToRTs PRocass at 778-80.38 1d. at 780-98.
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the proper balance between detailed nuances and brief, manageable
assertions of principle. Torts teachers should welcome the appearance
of this excellent casebook.
PETER N. SWAN*
*B.S. 1958, J.D. 1961, Stanford University; Professor of Law, University of Oregon,
Eugene.
